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By Margaret Levi (Editor)

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1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. J. Econ. Theory 12:472–82 Merrill S III. 1993. Voting behavior under the directional spatial model of electoral competition. Public Choice 77:739–56 Merrill S III, Adams J. 2001. Computing Nash equilibria in probabilistic, multiparty spatial models with non-policy components. Polit. Analysis 9:347–61 Merrill III, Grofman B. 1997a. Directional and proximity models of voter utility and choice: a new synthesis and an illustrative test of competing models.

S. House of Representatives. Public Choice 113:337–56 McKelvey RD. 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. J. Econ. Theory 12:472–82 Merrill S III. 1993. Voting behavior under the directional spatial model of electoral competition. Public Choice 77:739–56 Merrill S III, Adams J. 2001. Computing Nash equilibria in probabilistic, multiparty spatial models with non-policy components. Polit. Analysis 9:347–61 Merrill III, Grofman B. 1997a. Directional and proximity models of voter utility and choice: a new synthesis and an illustrative test of competing models.

Aldrich 1983, Aldrich & McGinnis 1989). Under these assumptions, party positions may diverge (Owen & Grofman 1995). , antiabortion activists or strong feminists), there is no reason to expect that different interest groups will contribute equally to each party. Although concern for “access” may tilt contributions toward the party in power, ceteris paribus, each group will tend to give more funding to the party whose candidates are more likely to sympathize with its cause. If money and direct campaign support translate into votes, then the existence of such differential contribution bases leads to policy divergence (cf.

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